The full-surface audit found the settings story half-true: `config set
download_dir` and the TUI's settings form edited a file a running daemon
never rereads, while the attached TUI displayed the laptop's path and
discarded the edit entirely.
- `download.set_dir`: a session-wide move, published in the contract;
the per-transfer destination stays refused. `daemon.status` reports
it and the next transfer lands there.
- `config set download_dir` and `config set shared_dirs` push to a
live daemon the way `shares add` does, through one shared helper;
the socket probe is paid only by the keys a daemon owns.
- The attached TUI seeds its settings form from the daemon's status,
pushes both folders over the socket as typed, reports a partial
refusal as exactly that, and creates no client-side directories. It
reads the daemon token from the resolved config — with the token only
in config.toml it could not attach over TCP — and settings
persistence honours --config instead of hard-coding the default path.
- `search.wishlist` records a start time, so an attached window
renders it as running rather than instantly finished.
The rest is the coverage the audit demanded: CLI-level token auth
(wrong, missing, and valid over TCP), `daemon status|stop` with
nothing running, --sort, --limit, --pick first, --password-cmd,
--log-file, --upload-slots, the config-named download folder in both
modes, and headless settings-form tests attached and local. Every
guard was checked by disabling what it protects. Both e2e modes run
green: 94 CLI tests each way, 16 protocol, 285 unit, 34 lib.
Michel de Graaf
cd56fb3b39