Three features the client half-had. SetStatus (28) was only ever sent as
"online" at login, so there was no way to go away; excluded search phrases
(160) were parsed and logged into nowhere, so every client kept spending
searches on queries the server was never going to answer; and a queued
download could answer a peer asking about its place but could never ask
about its own.
Each is now driven end to end: the away status seen by another user, a
refused query on a stub server that announces phrases (soulfind keeps its
filters in a database the suite cannot seed), and a peer's answer landing
on the download as its queue position.
Dispatch read one byte of the code, so a code with a non-zero high byte
was handled as its low byte. Message::get_message_code now reads the
whole little-endian uint32 and handlers register by u32. PeerInit and
PierceFirewall, the only frames with a one-byte code, get their own
accessor for the listener's first frame.
Seven region audits, every finding adversarially verified against the
whole workspace before being applied; 80 landed and the two that failed
in application were refuted honestly (ParseError has a from_str_radix
producer the audit missed; NatPmpError's Display is the only reader of
its diagnostic payloads).
The bigger cuts:
- The NewPeer/PierceFireWall cluster: an operation variant nothing ever
sent, its 77-line arm, a protocol-wrong Client::pierce_firewall that
wrote a peer-init frame down the server socket, and the struct only
they used. The live paths in peer/listen.rs are untouched.
- The ops loop reads `for operation in reader` instead of hand-rolling
recv/break, de-indenting the whole dispatch body.
- Dead lib surface: Message::print_hex and four unused accessors,
UploadFailed, registry and actor getters, build_watch_user,
strip_ansi_codes, delegating shims on ClientContext. Removing public
items makes this a semver major, which the release pipeline enforces.
- Never-used flexibility: the state-migration framework that never held
a migration, border-type helpers that all answered Rounded, the TUI's
max_concurrent_downloads field nothing read.
- Convergence: six poll loops into poll_until, three wrap-around
navigation blocks into cycle, hit tests into Rect::contains, char
walkers into floor/ceil_char_boundary, five Download literals into
one helper, the suites' shared scaffolding into tests/common.
Deliberately not taken: swapping the hand-rolled zlib inflate and MD5
for crates (they replace wire-facing machinery whose tolerance of
real-world peer quirks no local test exercises) and pulling chrono into
the lib for a log timestamp. Recorded for their own decision.
Net -1002 lines. Both e2e modes stay green: 94 CLI tests each way, 16
protocol, 33 lib, unit suites, clippy pedantic clean, aislop 100/100
with the four scanner false positives suppressed inline where they
fire.
The same unbounded-count DoS class fixed in the room parsers also exists
in three pre-existing parsers that read a length-prefixed vector count
straight off the wire: FileSearchResponse (SearchResult), the browse
SharedFileListResponse, and ExcludedSearchPhrases. A malicious/MITM
server or peer could send a tiny frame with a ~4-billion element count
and spin the actor thread into an OOM allocation loop.
Bound each loop (and the inner attribute loops, where read_int32 does
not advance past the buffer end) by the remaining payload. Regression
tests feed a hostile count and assert prompt, empty parses.
Michel de Graaf