Move the sanitizer next to the directory helpers so the CLI download
command and the daemon honour use_username_dirs too, not only the TUI.
Resumed downloads keep the folder they were saved with instead of
nesting the username a second time, and toggling the setting applies
to the next download without a restart. Document the config key.
`completions install` writes into a home directory, which a package
build does not have. `completions print <shell>` and `man` give it the
files to put under /usr/share instead.
With the login screen's own attempts no longer holding the port, a
session listens somewhere other than the configured port mainly when
another program already holds it. soulseek-rs still falls back to an
ephemeral port there, which is what lets several clients on one machine
share a configured port, and it advertises the port it really bound. A
manual port forward on the router then points at nothing, though, and
the TUI never said so; the CLI already warns.
After login the TUI compares the bound port with the configured one,
using the CLI's rule, and the status bar's title reads "port X in use,
listening on Y" for the rest of the session. A window attached to a
daemon shows nothing: the daemon owns its listener.
Nicotine+ keeps retrying the configured port every five seconds and
Soulseek.NET refuses it; neither falls back. Keeping the fallback and
making it visible is a deliberate difference.
The window could show any peer's share tree but never this account's, so
"am I actually sharing that?" had no answer short of asking a friend to
browse you. The tree is already there; what was missing was feeding it
from our own index.
B opens it — the same collapsible tree, filter, and navigation the peer
browse offers, built from `Shares::directories()`, which is the listing
GetShareFileList answers with. So what it shows is what the network sees,
not what the config meant to share. r re-scans the disk rather than
re-asking a peer, o steps across to the folders that feed it, and nothing
here queues a download from ourselves.
Attached to a daemon the index lives on the daemon's host, so it comes
back over a new `shares.files` method rather than being scanned locally;
`shares files [--filter]` prints the same listing headless, through the
`emit_listing` that `browse` now shares with it — the two are only
comparable while they are built the same way.
Two allocation fixes came out of the review, both on paths this reaches:
the daemon hands its listing to the DTO instead of deep-copying one it
already owns, and `Shares::directories()` allocates its map key once per
folder rather than once per file, which the peer-facing serve path has
been paying for all along.
The settings popup opens with an Account block: who the session is logged in
as, how much it shares, the port peers reach it on, and the daemon it borrows
when the window is attached to one. Two rows follow, both confirmed before
they act. A password is typed twice, because the server sends no verdict on a
change and a typo entered once would leave the account with a password nobody
knows. Logging out closes the window and comes back to the login screen with
the stored password deleted, so the next start asks rather than walking
straight back in. A window attached to a daemon offers no logout: the login is
the daemon's.
"Change it on the server, then store it where the login lives" is one function
over the session and the secret store, so the window, the command and the
daemon share the rule rather than each spelling out its own idea of which
process owns the password.
Headless the same two acts are `account password` and `account logout`, and
the daemon answers `account.password` so a routed run is not a dead end —
`whoami` already reported who is logged in and what they share.
The client read the distributed network but never carried it: a peer
dialling with a D connection was logged and dropped, and AcceptChildren
was hardcoded false, so this client took from the tree without ever
relaying a search for anyone else.
With accept_children set, peers hang from us: each is told where our
branch sits when it connects and again when the branch moves, every
search that reaches us is passed down, and a child that goes away loses
its slot. Ten at a time, matching Nicotine+, since each costs a socket
and a copy of the network's whole search stream — which is also why it is
opt-in, through the new accept_children config key (ignored without a
listener, since a child would have nothing to dial).
The peer listener died with "Too many open files (os error 24)" on any
long-lived non-daemon session: only the daemon raised RLIMIT_NOFILE, and
peer sockets were unbounded — no idle reaping, no deadlines on accepted
transfer streams, and one peer could hold two connections under split
registry identities.
- raise the open-file limit at the top of run(), for every entry point,
and warn from Client::connect when the soft limit is below 1024
- reap peer control connections idle for five minutes; a clean
disconnect no longer discards the peer's queued uploads
- give listener-supplied download streams and upload serving the same
read/write deadlines dialled sockets already had
- register inbound peers under their plain username so the registry
holds one connection per peer, and announce them like pierced ones
- hold the registry lock across actor spawn + insert and surface
thread-spawn failure, so an instantly-dead peer cannot leave a
zombie entry
Seven region audits, every finding adversarially verified against the
whole workspace before being applied; 80 landed and the two that failed
in application were refuted honestly (ParseError has a from_str_radix
producer the audit missed; NatPmpError's Display is the only reader of
its diagnostic payloads).
The bigger cuts:
- The NewPeer/PierceFireWall cluster: an operation variant nothing ever
sent, its 77-line arm, a protocol-wrong Client::pierce_firewall that
wrote a peer-init frame down the server socket, and the struct only
they used. The live paths in peer/listen.rs are untouched.
- The ops loop reads `for operation in reader` instead of hand-rolling
recv/break, de-indenting the whole dispatch body.
- Dead lib surface: Message::print_hex and four unused accessors,
UploadFailed, registry and actor getters, build_watch_user,
strip_ansi_codes, delegating shims on ClientContext. Removing public
items makes this a semver major, which the release pipeline enforces.
- Never-used flexibility: the state-migration framework that never held
a migration, border-type helpers that all answered Rounded, the TUI's
max_concurrent_downloads field nothing read.
- Convergence: six poll loops into poll_until, three wrap-around
navigation blocks into cycle, hit tests into Rect::contains, char
walkers into floor/ceil_char_boundary, five Download literals into
one helper, the suites' shared scaffolding into tests/common.
Deliberately not taken: swapping the hand-rolled zlib inflate and MD5
for crates (they replace wire-facing machinery whose tolerance of
real-world peer quirks no local test exercises) and pulling chrono into
the lib for a log timestamp. Recorded for their own decision.
Net -1002 lines. Both e2e modes stay green: 94 CLI tests each way, 16
protocol, 33 lib, unit suites, clippy pedantic clean, aislop 100/100
with the four scanner false positives suppressed inline where they
fire.
The full-surface audit found the settings story half-true: `config set
download_dir` and the TUI's settings form edited a file a running daemon
never rereads, while the attached TUI displayed the laptop's path and
discarded the edit entirely.
- `download.set_dir`: a session-wide move, published in the contract;
the per-transfer destination stays refused. `daemon.status` reports
it and the next transfer lands there.
- `config set download_dir` and `config set shared_dirs` push to a
live daemon the way `shares add` does, through one shared helper;
the socket probe is paid only by the keys a daemon owns.
- The attached TUI seeds its settings form from the daemon's status,
pushes both folders over the socket as typed, reports a partial
refusal as exactly that, and creates no client-side directories. It
reads the daemon token from the resolved config — with the token only
in config.toml it could not attach over TCP — and settings
persistence honours --config instead of hard-coding the default path.
- `search.wishlist` records a start time, so an attached window
renders it as running rather than instantly finished.
The rest is the coverage the audit demanded: CLI-level token auth
(wrong, missing, and valid over TCP), `daemon status|stop` with
nothing running, --sort, --limit, --pick first, --password-cmd,
--log-file, --upload-slots, the config-named download folder in both
modes, and headless settings-form tests attached and local. Every
guard was checked by disabling what it protects. Both e2e modes run
green: 94 CLI tests each way, 16 protocol, 285 unit, 34 lib.
A remote daemon could only be named with --daemon and --daemon-token on every
invocation, which made the one workflow daemon mode is most useful for — a
headless download box driven from a laptop — a matter of retyping a 64-character
token. Both are now config keys, so it is two 'config set' commands once and
plain commands thereafter.
Fixes a bug that setup exposed: the up-front daemon status probe read the token
from the command line only, so with the token in the config file it failed
silently and every command that names a path or a server fell back to this
machine's defaults — whoami claiming downloads land in the laptop's home
directory when they land on the box. The regression test was checked by
reintroducing the bug.
Documents the download-box workflow in plain terms across the README, the
website and the agent skill, and says plainly that the schema is open: OpenRPC,
served by the daemon itself, so an Android, iOS or web remote is something
anyone can build without asking.
shares add wrote the config file and stopped there, so with a daemon running
the folder stayed invisible to the network until the daemon restarted — the
command reported success and nothing had happened. Locally that is the right
meaning, because there is no session yet; a daemon is already the next run.
Both commands now push the new list over shares.set. The e2e test was checked
against a disabled push to confirm it detects the bug.
A review pass over the diff found seventeen confirmed defects. The worst was
the contract itself: every method's parameters were published as a single
descriptor named `params`, so a client generated from openrpc.json sent
{"params":{"params":{…}}} and every call failed -32602. Parameters are now
published per field, with a test asserting the published names are the keys
the daemon actually deserializes.
Security and lifecycle:
- download.start no longer lets a caller name a directory, which was an
arbitrary write on the daemon's host.
- The Unix socket is bound under a temporary name and renamed into place; it
was briefly connectable by any local user between bind and chmod, and on
that transport connecting is authenticating.
- Pre-auth reads are capped at 1 MiB with a 30s handshake timeout, and
connections are capped, so an unauthenticated peer cannot exhaust memory or
threads.
- A read error no longer returns past the hub unsubscribe, which leaked a
subscriber and two threads per occurrence.
- A client whose event queue fills is now actually disconnected. It used to be
dropped from the fan-out and left connected, working on but blind to every
event after — the documentation already promised otherwise.
- A client whose daemon vanishes mid-transfer is told at once instead of
waiting out its full timeout and reporting a misleading "gave up".
Contract accuracy: errors carry an explicit null id (a missing one reads as a
notification and gets dropped), a second auth answers with the published
shape, and nullable fields are sent rather than omitted so a generated client
sees one shape.
Also splits proto.rs and server.rs, whose concerns had diverged, and applies
the review's simplifications.
SOULSEEK_E2E_MODE=daemon makes the existing e2e harness serve every session
from a daemon instead of the command's own login, so the same 83 tests assert
the same records and exit codes both ways. CI runs the suite twice.
Two defects it found:
serve judged whether anything was shared from this run's configuration
rather than from the session, so routed to a daemon it would start with
nothing to serve and report success.
The TUI showed an empty conversation when attached, because the daemon's
message history was never asked for. It is now a SessionApi method, empty
locally, which puts the difference behind the seam.
main.rs is now a thin entry point over the library rather than a second copy
of every module, so the program compiles once instead of twice.
Michel de Graaf